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Abstract: Mikhalevich & Powell provide convincing empirical evidence that at least some
invertebrates are sentient and hence should be granted moral status. I agree and argue that
functional markers should be the primary indicators of sentience. Neuroanatomical homologies
provide only secondary evidence. Consensus regarding the validity of these functional markers will
be difficult to achieve. To be effective in practice, functional markers of sentience will have to be
tested and accepted species by species to overcome the implicit biases against extending moral
status to invertebrates.
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Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) argue convincingly that there is no empirically valid reason
to deny “certain invertebrates” the moral standing afforded to nonhuman vertebrates by
bioethics and science policy on the basis of comparable data. In the tradition of ethicists from
Jeremy Bentham (1780/2019) in the 18th century to Peter Singer (1975) in the 20th, M&P invoke
sentience as the touchstone for according moral status; they review the compelling evidence that
at least some invertebrates are sentient.
I would define sentience as the minimal capacity for direct subjective experience of the
qualities associated with sensations, including accompanying affective states. Sentient beings,
therefore, have the ability to feel an experience, and this feel will have some “valence” associated
with it; in the simplest context, the experience may be either good or bad. As M&P note, the focus
of bioethics and science policy governing the use of animals in research has followed Bentham’s
emphasis on the prevention of bad experiences, particularly pain and suffering. For example,
detailed protocols are in place regarding the use of specific anesthetics and analgesics during and
after surgery in experimental vertebrate animals.
In addition to the moral obligation to avoid creating pain “broadly construed” in animal
subjects, M&P also clearly articulate our moral obligation to “provide positive conditions in which
sentient animals can flourish — environments in which they can experience greater amounts of
pleasure and develop their natural range of abilities.” This is a valid philosophical position, but
the practical complexity of determining what constitutes pleasure and flourishing in nonverbal
animals makes it even more complicated to resolve the fundamental problem discussed
extensively by M&P: determining whether nonverbal animals are sentient at all.
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Achieving a consensus solution on sentience has already proven elusive, even when the
discussion is limited to one specific qualitative sensation — the feeling of pain — and the subjects
are vertebrates, such as fishes. Fishes exhibit many flexible and intricate behaviors strongly
supporting the inference that they have a high level of cognitive sophistication. Fishes also
respond to analgesics in the same way mammals do — convincing support that fishes are sentient
and experience pain (Brown 2014, Sneddon 2015, Sneddon et al. 2018).
Some scientists (Key 2016, Rose 2002, Rose et al. 2014) strongly disagree, contending that
even the most complex behaviors of fishes are explicable as reflexes and complex species-typical
behaviors, and that the effects of analgesics in fishes can be explained not by their ability to block
the conscious experience of pain, but solely by their ability to blockade nociception. They argue
that the brains of fishes are too simple to support sentience, but research spanning the last three
decades indicates that the neuroanatomy of the brains of fishes is remarkably complex and
exhibits several of the physiological markers suggested to accompany phenomenal consciousness
and the experience of pain in humans (Woodruff 2017, 2018a, b). Although the neuroanatomy of
fishes is not homologous with the thalamo — cortical system of mammals — fish brains are
capable of functioning in an analogous manner to produce similar behavioral and physiological
markers of sentience.
These findings support the position of M&P, which should emphasize analogy rather than
homology. In the biological sciences, structures are defined as homologous across species when
they are inherited from a common ancestor. They may or may not have the same function as they
did in that ancestor or in members of other descendent species. An independent analysis of the
relationship between anatomical structure and metrics such as physiological or behavioral
activities must be made before functional analogies can be formulated for homologous
structures. Or, as M&P express it, “homology hypotheses are not function-free and hence have
no independent advantages over functional analyses of convergent brains.”
Functional markers of mental states, such as sentience, are fundamental. Structural
homologies are secondary. Behavioral and physiological activities analogous to those associated
with sentience in vertebrates are adequate to establish sentience in invertebrate species
regardless of whether their brains are homologous structurally. Achieving consensus on which
functional activities are valid markers of mental states has proven difficult even for some
vertebrate species; hence reaching a consensus for invertebrates that includes markers for
flourishing — a concept far more complex than simply feeling pain — will be still more difficult.
Moreover, if the goal is change in public policy, lay policymakers must be meaningfully involved
in the discussion. In my own experience, laypersons often find it more difficult than professional
scientists and philosophers to substitute rational, evidence-based decision-making for the
cognitive-affective biases described by M&P.
M&P discuss the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP) proposed by Birch (2017)
as a way of generalizing functional observations across an entire order of animal. They note
difficulties with the ASPP, including behavioral underdetermination. I agree with this critique and
would go further to suggest that overcoming disgust and the empathy gap cannot be realistically
approached other than with species-by-species analyses of behavioral activities. This does not
eliminate the problem of behavioral underdetermination, but it will make generalizability more
convincing because of the similarity of the subjects involved.
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If behaviors that many people accept as indicators of the ability to have positive and
negative feelings are identified in an invertebrate species, it will become easier for people to
develop empathy for an alien-appearing animal such as the octopus (Mather 2019), and thereby
become more concerned about its welfare. This proposal is supported by social psychologists who
have discovered that humans who eat meat attribute significantly fewer indicators of sentience
to animals that end up on their plate than do vegetarians (Bastian et al. 2012, Bilewiczi et al. 2011,
Loughnan et al. 2010).
In conclusion, I have attempted to make the following points. First, in agreement with M&P,
based on inferring sentience from empirical evidence that reveals the flexibility and complexity
of their behaviors, moral status should be extended to at least some invertebrates. Second,
functional behavioral and physiological markers should be the primary indicators of sentience in
invertebrates. Structural neuroanatomical homologies provide only secondary evidence. Third, a
consensus that these functional markers are valid indicators of sentience will be difficult to
achieve; to be effective in practice, they will have to be provided and accepted on a species-byspecies basis rather than en bloc. Finally, I agree with Levy (2020) that “Much of the work done
by appeals to phenomenal consciousness can in fact be done by functionalizable properties of the
mind” (p. 2). To overcome the implicit biases against extending moral status to invertebrates,
convincing evidence of sentience will be a practical necessity for each species.
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